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Abstract
An option market maker who executes an option order turns to the stock market to hedge away the underlying
stock exposure. Thus, the stock exposure imbalance in option transactions translates directly into order
imbalance in stock trades. In this paper, I decompose total order imbalance in stock transactions into the
imbalance induced by option transactions and the imbalance induced by stock transactions independent
of option trading activities. I find that the stock exposure imbalance induced by option transactions has
strong predictive power of stock returns that does not reverse at long horizons. The independent stock order
imbalance has a transitory price impact. The option-based stock return prediction increases with the level
of information asymmetry, short-sale costs, and options market activity. The option-induced imbalance also
predicts cumulative abnormal returns five days before earnings announcements.
JEL Classification: G14, G12, G13.
Keywords: Options, order flow, information asymmetry, delta, price discovery
∗I owe special thanks to Henry Schwartz for generously providing option tick data at Trade Alert LLC. For their comments, I
also thank Linda Allen, Turan Bali, Fangjian Fu, Harmeet Goindi, Armen Hovakimian, Robert Jarrow, Mehdi Karoui (discussant),
Lin Peng, Henry Schwartz, Robert Schwartz, Zhaogang Song (discussant), Jun Tu, Mitch Warachka (discussant), Jason Wei, Liuren
Wu, Yangru Wu, Rui Yao, Joe Zhang, Xiaofei Zhao (discussant), Hao Zhou, and the seminar participants at Baruch College, Central
University of Finance and Economics, DePaul University, Fordham University, Rutgers University Camden, Singapore Manage-
ment University, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Trade Alert LLC, the Sixth Annual Risk Management Conference in
Singapore, the 2012 European Finance Association Doctoral Tutorial in Copenhagen, the 2012 Northern Finance Association Con-
ference, the 22nd Annual Derivatives Securities and Risk Management Conference at the FDIC, and the Sixth Annual Conference
on Asia-Pacific Financial Markets. I welcome comments, including any references I have inadvertently overlooked.
†Department of Economics and Finance, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, One Bernard Baruch Way, Box 10-225,
New York, NY 10010; 646-312-3287; jianfeng.hu@baruch.cuny.edu.
1
Published in Journal of Financial Economics, 2014 March, Volume 111, Issue 3, Pages 625-645.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.12.004
1. Introduction
Many microstructure theories, such as those of Ho and Stoll (1981), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle
(1985), and Easley and O’Hara (1987), all suggest that stock order flow can affect stock prices. Empiri-
cally, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) provide evidence that the stock order flow predicts future
stock returns at the market level, and Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) provide evidence of the return
predictability in the stock cross section. The stock options market provides an alternative for gaining stock
exposures. Several studies, such as Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and Pan and Poteshman (2006),
show that options order flow can also predict the underlying stock returns. In this paper, I examine how
options order flow interacts with stock order flow to generate the stock return predictability.
When a customer executes an option order, the option market maker takes the opposite position by
earning the bid-ask spread. Given relative scarcity of option transactions, it is difficult for the market maker
to immediately unload the position via trades in opposite directions. Market makers often need to hold
option positions for a long time, frequently until option expiry. To reduce risk exposure, it is now standard
practice for market makers to perform delta hedging by trading on the underlying stocks. Therefore, if option
transactions generate an imbalance in stock exposure, that stock exposure imbalance can be transferred to the
stock market as a stock order imbalance through the delta hedging practice used by option market makers.
As a result, some of the order imbalance in the stock market can be induced by option transactions.
To understand the interaction between the two markets, I decompose the aggregate stock order imbalance
into two components: (i) an imbalance induced by option transactions and (ii) the remaining imbalance
induced by stock market transactions that are unrelated to options market activities. To compute the option-
induced order imbalance, I compute the hedging ratio, delta, of each option transaction using the real-time
spot price and implied volatility. I use the delta of the option to capture the stock exposure of each option
transaction, and I aggregate the delta of all option transactions within a certain period as the option-induced
stock order imbalance, assuming that the market makers fully delta-hedge their option transactions and that
the customers intentionally gain stock exposure from the option transactions and, hence, do not hedge their
stock exposure.
I subtract that option-induced stock order imbalance from the total order imbalance to arrive at the resid-
ual imbalance that is induced purely by stock market investors and is unrelated to the option transactions.
The decomposition enables me to separate the two sources of order imbalance and to investigate the role of
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each source of order imbalance in the stock return predictability.
I compute the daily stock order imbalance on a large cross section of stocks with options from April
2008 to August 2010. On average, there are 2,207 stocks each day in the sample. I analyze the return
predictability of the order imbalance in the cross section. Several interesting results emerge: First, only
option-induced order imbalance positively predicts the next day’s stock returns. An investment analysis
shows that firms in the highest quintile of option-induced order imbalance outperform those in the lowest
quintile by 8.736 basis points on the next day (22% annualized, t-statistic = 6.03). The independent stock
order imbalance has large contemporaneous price impact but shows no significant predictive ability for stock
returns on the next day.
Second, the return predictability from the option-induced order imbalance does not reverse direction at
longer horizons, suggesting that such predictability is more likely to be driven by permanent information
flow than by temporary price pressure. Finally, in an intraday analysis at half-hour intervals, I also find that
the option-induced imbalance has permanent price impact, whereas the independent stock imbalance gen-
erates only transitory price impact. Those findings highlight the information content in option transactions
and pinpoint the importance of separating it from other stock market transactions.
I then investigate how the information content of option transactions varies with different types of option
contracts. I calculate option-induced order imbalances for at-the-money (ATM), in-the-money (ITM), and
out-of-the-money (OTM) options separately. OTM options provide the highest leverage to investors but the
transaction costs in terms of percentage bid-ask spread are also the largest for OTM options. I find that the
predictive power of the option-induced order imbalance comes mainly from ATM and ITM options but not
OTM options.
I also investigate how the return predictability of the option-induced stock imbalance varies with differ-
ent types of firms. I classify firms based on three types of characteristics: level of information asymmetry,
short-sale costs, and market trading activities. I apply five measures of information asymmetry: the prob-
ability of informed trading (PIN), the number of stock analysts following, the bid-ask spread on the stock
market, the adverse-selection component of the bid-ask spread, and the firm size. When I organize firms into
three groups based on each of the asymmetry variables, I find that the option-induced stock order imbalance
always has the largest predictive coefficient and t-statistic in the group of informationally opaque firms that
is, firms with high PIN, low analyst coverage, large spread, large adverse-selection component of the spread,
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and small market capitalization. My findings support the hypothesis that the return predictability of options
order flow is driven by informed trading in the options market.
When I classify firms into three groups based on institutional holding, a proxy for short-sale costs,
the group with low institutional ownership generates both the largest predictive coefficient estimate and
the highest statistical significance. That finding supports the hypothesis that firms with lower institutional
ownership are more likely to be subject to short-sale constraints in the stock market because it is more
difficult to borrow shares to meet short interests on such stocks. As a result, informed traders with negative
news may have to place more orders in the options market as an alternative to short selling (Figlewski and
Webb, 1993; Johnson and So, 2012).
I also find that option-induced order imbalance becomes more informative when option trading is active
and total option trading volume is high. Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) predict in their theoretical
work that informed traders prefer to trade in deep markets. My finding supports that theoretical prediction.
In particular, consistent with the short-sale-constraint story, I find that predictive price response to option-
induced order imbalance is asymmetric: negative order imbalance has stronger predictive power than does
positive order imbalance.
In an event study on earnings announcements, I find that option-induced order imbalance predicts cu-
mulative abnormal returns five days before the announcement. The predictability is robust to alternative
event windows and is greater when the earnings surprise is large and the dispersion of analyst forecasts is
high. The results suggest that option trading is more informative when there exists substantial asymmetry
of information and the profit from informed trading is high.
The findings in this paper have at least two important implications: First, the analysis underlines the
importance of separating option-induced stock order imbalance from order imbalance generated by pure
stock market investors. The existing literature often compares order flows and trading volumes from the
two markets directly. Through careful separation, I show that options order flow contains an important
informative component – about future stock price movement – that is not in stock order flow. Therefore, this
decomposition is critical in measuring information content in order flows.
Second, my findings also elucidate the ongoing debate regarding where informed traders place their or-
ders. A long list of empirical studies spotlights investigations of the cross-market information flow between
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the stock market and the options market.1 In a closely related study, Pan and Poteshman (2006) show that
put-call option volume ratio predicts future stock prices in the cross section. This paper takes a step further
to investigate the interaction of options and stock order flows at both interday and intraday frequencies. To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to show that permanent price information in stock order flow
is induced mostly by option transactions, suggesting that informed traders do use options.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the price impact of
option trading. Section 3 proposes a decomposition method for total stock order imbalance and develops
the hypotheses for empirical tests. Section 4 describes the data used in this study. In section 5, I report
the empirical results of the hypothesis tests. Section6 provides additional analysis on the predictive power
resulting from option transactions. Section 7 concludes.
2. Background and motivation
The actual trading of derivative securities can convey important information in a market with informa-
tion asymmetry. Black (1975) first notes the possibility of the options market as an alternative trading venue
for informed traders because option contracts provide higher leverage. Biais and Hillion (1994) examine
the impact on informed trading from option introduction and find that informed traders’ profit can either
increase or decrease depending on type of liquidity orders. Focusing on how private information gets in-
corporated into security prices, Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) formalize a two-market microstructure
model whereby informed traders can choose to trade either stock or options. The authors show that there
exists a pooling equilibrium whereby informed traders trade both stock and options if both the leverage of
the options and the options market liquidity are sufficiently high. They further argue that the availability of
multiple contracts in the options market can present difficult learning problems for uninformed traders, thus
making option contracts more attractive to informed traders. If informed traders trade in the options market,
options order flow can contain permanent price information about underlying stocks.
Options order flow can gain return predictability in another important but less discussed way. Start-
ing with Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), modern derivative pricing theory is built on the
1See, for example, Manaster and Rendleman (1982), Bhattacharya (1987), Anthony (1988), Stephan and Whaley (1990), Chan,
Chung, and Johnson (1993), Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002), Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew
(2004), Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005), Holowczak, Simaan, and Wu (2006), Pan and Poteshman (2006), Ni, Pan, and Poteshman
(2008), and Pearson, Muravyev, and Broussard (2012).
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no-arbitrage argument. Other than the price relationship between options and the underlying security, the
no-arbitrage argument also explains how to hedge option positions by using the underlying security, which
implies reverse dependence on trading volume and order flow. After an option trader executes a transaction,
the option market maker takes the opposite position and gains risk exposure to the underlying price move-
ment as well as other factors such as return volatility. Because options market liquidity is usually not high
enough for market makers to unload inventory immediately (liquidity is further diluted to hundreds of dif-
ferent option contracts on the same underlying security), market makers can hedge the underlying price risk
by transacting in the underlying market. The hedge ratio is captured by option price sensitivity to the under-
lying price movement, delta. Meanwhile, non-market makers can also perform delta hedging if they intend
to gain risk exposures other than delta. In so doing, they not only trade stocks to hedge delta by themselves,
but also induce option maker makers to perform delta hedging too. Therefore, the options order flow can
lead to subsequent stock order flow through delta hedging transactions; and information in the options order
flow is also passed to the stock market. However, even without private information, hedging transactions
can cause transitory price pressure on the underlying market in the same way as do stock transactions that
are unrelated to the options market. Empirically, Ni, Pearson, and Poteshman (2005) show that the practice
of delta hedging causes underlying stock prices to cluster at option strike prices.2
The theoretical discussion has motivated many empirical studies on the informational linkage across
the two markets. A group of researchers focus on the relationship between actual stock prices and option
implied stock prices. Early studies such as Manaster and Rendleman (1982) and Bhattacharya (1987) find
that the options market leads the stock market in price discovery. However, more evidence points to the
opposite direction. For example, Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) find the information share of
options quotes is less than 20% on average. Holowczak, Simaan, and Wu (2006) show that the information
share of options quotes is even decreasing over time, and they argue that it is due to the prevailing use of
computers for automatic updating of option quotes. In a recent study, Pearson, Muravyev, and Broussard
(2012) find it is option quotes, but not stock quotes, that adjust to eliminate arbitrage opportunities across
the two markets. Those authors conclude that the options market does not play a role in price discovery.
Another strand of empirical research directly investigates options order flow. Many studies – including
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Poteshman (2006), Holowczak, Hu, and Wu (2011) and Dong and
Sinha (2011) – find that options order flow is able to predict future stock returns in time series regressions
2In the structured equity product market, Henderson and Pearson (2010) find that hedging transactions raise the prices of
underlying stocks by almost 100 basis points on the pricing date.
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for a small group of stocks.
In a closely related study, Pan and Poteshman (2006) investigate information content of options order
flow in the cross section of stocks. Using a unique data set, those authors construct put-call volume ratios
from option buyers to open new positions. They find that the open-buy put-call ratio negatively predicts
returns and the return predictability lasts over three weeks. However, most studies on options order flow do
not control stock order flow. It is still unclear how options and stock order flows interact to generate return
predictability. Since informed traders can trade in both markets, it is important to understand whether the
options market makes a marginal contribution to embedding private information into stock prices.
Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) investigate the informational role of order flows and quote revisions on
the two markets. They find that options order flow does not have a pricing effect but the stock order flow
does. Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005) examine order flow information around mergers and acquisitions events.
Their results suggest that options volume imbalance becomes significantly informative about future stock
prices right before merger announcements but remains silent during normal periods. Overall, no significant
return predictability is found for options order flow once stock order flow is controlled for. However, the
stock order flow analyzed in these two studies are total stock order flow, which nests the option-induced stock
transactions. The mixed stock order flow can absorb both information content and return predictability from
options order flow. Therefore, information content in different markets must be separated carefully before
any lead-lag analysis can be conducted.
One challenge of measuring information content in options order flow is that option trading can be
motivated by risk factors other than the underlying stock price. For example, Ni, Pan, and Poteshman
(2008) show that net demand of volatility risk in the options market positively predicts the next day’s realized
volatility in the cross section. It is therefore critical to specify the type of information to extract from options
order flow and design an effective measure for that purpose. The same problem occurs when measuring price
pressure from delta hedging transactions. If volatility traders use options-only strategies such as straddles
and strangles, they need not hedge in the stock market. Such trades have neutral impact on option market
makers’ delta positions and hedging demand. However, volatility traders can also use a combination of
options and stock to construct delta-neutral positions, and it is possible that both volatility traders and option
market makers will hedge delta positions in the stock market. With the presence of volatility traders in the
options market, measuring underlying stock price information and price pressure from options order flow is
no longer straight forward. I propose a solution to the problem in next section.
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This paper is also motivated by some recent development in the options market. Most studies use data
from before 2000, when the options market in the United States is not yet a consolidated national market
(see Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings, 2004). Multiple listings on different exchanges and price competitions
are not common at that time, and transaction costs in the options market are very high. After 2000, as a result
of the SEC’s efforts and technology development in quote updating and order routing, the options market
has experienced tremendous growth and consolidation. Options market quality and liquidity have improved
significantly. For informed traders, those changes lead to lower transaction costs and higher trading profits
and can affect their order allocation decisions. Therefore, it is worthwhile to reexamine the information
content of options order flow in a more recent sample period. Also, lack of liquidity in the past significantly
limits the sample size of empirical analysis. For example, Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) have only 14
stocks in their sample, out of which, the most active option ticker, General Electric (GE), has an average
daily trading volume of 2,595 option lots. By comparison, GE’s option trading volume reaches 134,874 lots
on April 1, 2008, the first day in my sample; and the average option trading volume of all common stocks is
3,255 lots on that day. The growth of the options market facilitates the expansion of the sample coverage. In
this study, I include all common stocks with options, and I focus on the cross-sectional relationship between
order flows and future returns.
3. Methodology
This section begins by explaining how to measure price information in options and stock order flows. It
then describes the primary hypotheses and the empirical testing methods.
3.1. Option order imbalance
A remarkable feature of the options market is that hundreds of option contracts can underlie the same
security. For example, on January 2, 2009, there are 478 option contracts underlying the common stock of
Apple Inc., spanning 61 strike prices from $12.5 to $400 3 and 6 expiry dates from 15 days to 750 days.
Because each contract has its unique combination of put/call type, strike price, and maturity, the trading
process for each option contract does not necessarily reveal the underlying price information in the same
way. Measuring the price information in the options order flow is challenging. In a recent study, Holowczak,
3The closing price of Apple stock is $90.75 on that day.
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Hu, and Wu (2011) show that risk exposure to the underlying stock price (delta) is an important consideration
when one is aggregating stock price information in option transactions. Following those authors’ intuition,
I propose a standardized measure of option order imbalance (OOI):
OOIit =
∑Nj=1 100Dirit j ·deltait j · sizeit j
Num shares outstandingi
. (1)
The option order imbalance, OOIit , is measured for stock i on day t. Dirit j is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the jth option trade on stock i is initiated by the buyer, and -1 if the trade is initiated by the seller,
according to certain trade signing algorithms. deltait j is the option price sensitivity to the underlying stock
price, and sizeit j denotes the trade size in option lots (100 shares of the underlying stock). The numerator
is thus the net delta position of non-market makers in the options market. The order flow is more likely to
be imbalanced when trading is inactive, and that imbalance can reflect mere noise caused by uninformed
trades. To address this issue, I scale net delta volume with the number of common shares outstanding for
cross-sectional standardization. 4
OOI measures the directional trading intention of non-market makers in the options market. To link OOI
to information content and hedging demand in the stock market, I make the following assumption.
Assumption: On average, option trading on non-delta risk exposures has neutral impact on delta imbal-
ance in the options market, and uninformed option trading on delta risk exposure is also balanced.
Under the assumption, OOI is driven by informed traders with advanced stock price information, and
the magnitude of the imbalance then measures those informed traders’ aggressiveness and amount of in-
formation regarding the underlying stock price. Moreover, OOI also determines net delta hedging demand
and price pressure caused in the stock market. This is true because informed traders intentionally seek delta
exposures in the options and do not hedge, and only option market makers perform delta hedging. Market
makers take the opposite delta position to OOI, and they will then have to transact the same number of
stocks in the stock market to offset the delta position. Although it is unknown when option market makers
will perform delta hedging after receiving option orders, one can still infer option market makers’ net stock
demand at least on a daily basis because option market makers tend to go home flat–meaning, they normally
keep delta-neutral positions overnight. Note that option market makers do not necessarily wait until the
4I have also experimented with alternative scalers such as total delta volume and total stock volume for robustness checks. My
primary results hold qualitatively, but these alternative scalers are more likely to generate outliers during inactive trading periods.
Hence, I do not report those results in the paper.
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end of the day to hedge when the net delta position is known. It is difficult to track all of the stock orders
submitted by option market makers, and total transaction volume can be much higher than the numerator in
equation ( 1). Nonetheless, one can learn option market makers’ net demand for number of shares to hedge
the newly established option positions if the hedge ratio does not fluctuate too much intraday.5 One should
be reminded that OOI does not include stock demand from dynamic hedging on past option positions. Those
hedging transactions cannot be identified without knowing the market makers’ net positions, and they do
not contain any new information. Therefore, in this study, they are treated as liquidity trades in the stock
market.
3.2. Stock order imbalance
Defining option order imbalance in terms of delta imbalance has a great advantage because now I can
calculate the stock order imbalance (SOI) that is not related to options market activity by removing the
delta imbalance from the total stock order imbalance. Subsequently, the stock order imbalance induced by
non-options market activity is defined as
SOIit = TOIit −OOIit =
∑Nj=1 Dirit j · sizeit j
Num shares outstandingi
−OOIit, (2)
where TOIit is the total stock order imbalance in terms of trading volume, and Dirit j and sizeit j are the
direction dummy and the size of the jth trade of firm i on day t in the stock market, respectively. I also
scale that order imbalance with total number of shares outstanding to keep it consistent with OOI. After
subtraction of OOIit , the remainder is simply the stock order imbalance unrelated to options order flow.
3.3. Main test
To gauge return predictability from order flows in the two markets, I estimate the following equation in
the cross section:
Reti,t = α+
5
∑
k=1
βk1SOIi,t−k +
5
∑
k=1
βk2OOIi,t−k +θXi,t−1+ εi,t , (3)
5Although option order imbalance can also be measured by number of trades and dollar volume, it is more difficult to relate
such imbalance to hedging demand because delta hedging should be based on number of shares.
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where for stock i, Reti,t is the stock return on day t, calculated using the midpoint of the bid-ask spread and
where Xi,t−1 is a set of control variables, including the closing bid-ask spread of the stock, the stock turnover
ratio, log trading volumes in the two markets, and the stock returns from day t −5 to t −1.6
Hypothesis 1: SOI positively predicts future stock returns–at least for some k, βk1 > 0. If the predictabil-
ity comes from the price impact of liquidity trades, the predictive relationship reverses its sign at longer
horizons. If the predictability comes from informed trading in the stock market, the predictive relationship
does not reverse its sign.
With asymmetric information in the market, stock order flows can reveal private information; and SOI
is able to predict future permanent price changes (see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley
and O’Hara, 1987). Positive (Negative) SOI should reflect the buying (selling) of informed traders with
good (bad) news. Alternatively, even in the absence of information asymmetry, market makers can lift the
quoted price on positive order imbalance and reduce the quoted price on negative order imbalance to entice
offsetting orders and return to their optimal portfolios. As a result, SOI also positively predicts the future
price changes. However, that price impact is short-lived. Once the price pressure from the order imbalance
disappears, the stock price will return to its fundamental value. Thus, a reverse predictive relationship exists
at longer horizons.
Hypothesis 2: OOI positively predicts future stock returns controlling for SOI–that is., at least for some
k, βk2 > 0. If the predictability comes from price pressure of the option market makers’ delta hedging, the
predictive relationship reverses its sign at longer horizons. If the predictability comes from informed trading
in the options market, the predictive relationship does not reverse.
Similar to SOI, OOI can predict future returns due to either price pressure of delta hedging trades or
informed trading in the options market. Controlling SOI, OOI then captures the marginal contribution of
options order flow in price discovery.
6In theory, the private information in order flows is about specific firms rather than the entire market and the imbalance should
have greater predictive ability about idiosyncratic returns. In unreported tests, I use risk-adjusted returns as the dependent variable
and find stronger results.
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3.4. Option leverage
Hypothesis 3: If informed traders use options for reasons of leverage, they should prefer options that
give them the highest leverage. Therefore, the order imbalance of these options will be more informative
about future stock returns.
To test that hypothesis, I divide all option transactions into three groups based on their moneyness, delta:
(i) out-of-the-money (OTM, |delta| < 0.375), (ii) at-the-money (ATM, 0.375 ≤ |delta| ≤ 0.625), and (iii)
in-the-money (ITM, |delta| > 0.625). Although OTM options have the smallest delta, they provide the
highest leverage for every dollar investment because of their low prices. ITM options have the lowest dollar
leverage among the three groups. I calculate OOI separately for the three option groups and estimate the
following equation:
Reti,t = α+β1SOIi,t−1+β2OTM OOIi,t−1+β3ATM OOIi,t−1+β4ITM OOIi,t−1+θXi,t−1+ εi,t , (4)
where Reti,t , SOIi,t−1, and Xi,t−1 are the same as defined before, and OTM OOIi,t−1, ATM OOIi,t−1, and
ITM OOIi,t−1 are delta order imbalances calculated using OTM, ATM, and ITM options respectively.
3.5. Level of information asymmetry
If the price impact of OOI comes from informed trading, I expect the predictive ability of OOI to
be greater for firms that are more likely to have information asymmetry. I use five proxies for the level of
information asymmetry: PIN of Easley and O’Hara (1992), the number of analysts following, the percentage
bid-ask spread, the adverse-selection component of the bid-ask spread, and the firm size. To calculate the
adverse selection component of the spread, I use both the Glosten and Harris (1988) and Lin, Sanger, and
Booth (1995) models.
Hypothesis 4: If options order flow reveals private information, the predictive ability of OOI should be
greater for firms with more information asymmetry–that is, high PIN, low analyst coverage, large bid-ask
spread, and large adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.
Based on each proxy of information asymmetry, I first sort all firms by ascending order every day, and
divide the full sample into three subgroups–low, medium, and high–with cutoff points at the 30th and 70th
12
percentiles. I then reestimate equation (3) in each subgroup and compare the estimated coefficients and
t-statistics of OOI across subgroups.
3.6. Short-sale costs
Other than level of information asymmetry, short-sale costs will also have an impact on the predictive
ability of OOI. It is well-known that options are used as devices to circumvent the short-sale constraint.
For stocks that are more difficult to short, option trading can have greater informational benefits because
informed traders with negative news can be forced to trade options only. Institutional ownership as a proxy
for the market supply of short interests is known to be negatively related with the difficulty of short selling
(Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005). Thus, I propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: Return predictability from OOI is greater for firms with low institutional ownership be-
cause it is more difficult to borrow shares of these firms to sell short.
To test that hypothesis, I reestimate equation (3) in three subgroups based on institutional ownership:
low (< 30%), medium (30 ∼ 70%), and high (≥ 70%) and compare both the statistical and economic sig-
nificances of the estimated OOI coefficients in the subgroups.
3.7. Information versus illiquidity
Order imbalance can predict future returns due to either informed trading or price pressure. However,
the two mechanisms have very different theoretical grounds and very different practical implications. Tests
on long-run reversals of a predictive relationship can help disentangle the two economic stories. For a
robustness check, I further investigate the interaction of the return predictability and the market liquidity. If
a market is perfectly liquid, the price impact from a temporary imbalance in buy and sell orders is small.
On the other hand, the return predictability from order imbalance can be strong in liquid markets because of
lower transaction costs if it is due to informed trading.
Hypothesis 6: If price impact from OOI is due to market illiquidity, it should decrease when the options
market liquidity improves; alternatively, if the price impact is due to informed trading, it should increase
when market liquidity improves.
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To test that hypothesis, I divide the full sample into three option volume groups and reestimate equation
(3) in the subgroups.
4. Data
Analysis of the order flows in both markets requires the merging of several databases. This section
describes the details of the data sources, the sample selection, and the variable construction.
4.1. Options market activity
I obtain option transaction data on 611 trading days from April 2008 to August 2010 from Trade Alert
LLC, a specialized option market data vendor. The data include all trade messages recorded by the Options
Price Reporting Authority (OPRA), a national information processor that consolidates market information
generated by option trading on all US option exchanges. Trade Alert matches option transaction data with
underlying spot price and computes option implied volatility for each transaction from a binomial tree in
real time. Following the quote rule, Trade Alert also classifies each trade as either buyer-initiated or seller-
initiated. A trade is classified as buyer-initiated if the price is above the last effective mid quote price,
and as seller-initiated if the price is below the mid quote price. Such comprehensive trade data facilitate a
cross-sectional study over a relatively long period.
I exclude all indexes, units, ADRs, REITs, closed end funds, ETFs, and foreign firms and focus on
common stocks only (CRSP share codes 10 and 11). For computing OOI, I exclude the following trades: (i)
off-hour trades, (ii) trades at market open (the first 15 minutes) and market close (the last five minutes), (iii)
trades that are reported to the OPRA as “late” or “cancel”, (iv) trades flagged as part of structured trades,
and (v) data errors such as 0 strike price or 0 trade price. I filter out (i), (ii), and (iii) because the trade
classification is less reliable for those trades; (iv) because those trades are less likely to be about stock price
information than about volatility information, etc.; and (v) for obvious reasons. I also exclude stock-split
days and dividend days because of their complex implications for options pricing and trading.
In table 1, I present the primary statistics for the full options sample as well as for four transaction-type
groups: buy call, sell call, buy put, and sell put. Because the quote rule is unable to classify trade directions
when the trade price falls exactly on the mid quote or when there is no valid quote at all, some trades in
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the sample cannot be classified into any of the four transaction-type groups. I do not report the statistics
for that group because those trades are not of interest to the study.7 On average, 1,670 stocks per day have
at least one valid option transaction, with the maximum at 1,909 and the minimum at 1,395. Call options
are traded more often than put options because the average daily number of firms with call transactions
exceeds the average daily number of firms with put transactions in both the buy and sell categories in panel
A. Trade level statistics are reported in panel B. The average trade size is 17.45 lots in the full sample.
The call option trades are, on average, smaller than the put option trades. However, call options have a
much larger average daily number of trades than put options do. Therefore, the average daily volume of
call options also exceeds that of put options by approximately 0.77 million lots. The average premium of
all single-name options traded on a day exceeds $ 1 billion. Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman
(2006) find that non-market maker participants take net long positions in daily option volume from 1990
to 2001.Panel B confirms their finding by showing that for both call and put options, there are more buy
trades than sell trades in terms of both volume and premium. Panel C presents the distribution of trading
volume across option moneyness and time to expiration. Across the moneyness, OTM options are the most
frequently traded, accounting for over 50% of the entire market volume; ATM options account for 33.91%
of the total volume; and ITM options have the smallest share, with only 14.14%. The same pattern can be
found in the four transaction-type groups. Additionally, across the three moneyness regions, non-market
maker participants take net long positions except for ITM puts. Order imbalance is largest for OTM options
and smallest for ITM options. Across maturities, approximately 37% of the transactions are for options
expiring in 30 calendar days. Options expiring in 31 to 60 days account for 27.91% of the total volume.
Given the fact that I exclude all option trades expiring in less than 10 days, most trades are on short term
options. The same pattern exists in the four transaction-type groups, and the buy volume always exceeds the
sell volume.
At the beginning of the sample period, there are seven option exchanges in the OPRA plan: the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange (AMEX), the Boston Options Exchange (BOX), the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE), the International Securities Exchange (ISE), NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange ARCA
(NYSE), and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX). During the sample period, another participant ex-
change, the Better Trading System (BATS), joins the OPRA on February 26, 2010. The last panel of table1
presents the volume share by exchanges. The CBOE and the ISE lead in market share as each of them
7The trade direction is assigned to 0 for these trades. Therefore, unclassified trades have no impact on OOI in empirical
analysis. Omitting that group, however, can cause the full-sample statistic to be different from the sum or weighted average of the
four transaction-type groups.
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attracts more than one quarter of the total volume: 29.66% and 27.43%, respectively. The PHLX is also
competitive, attracting 16.92% of the total volume, followed by the NYSE at 11.59% and the AMEX at
7.15%. The BOX and NASDAQ are relatively small markets; neither has more than 5% of market share.
The BATS does not have much market share because it is newly established. The Herfindahl index of the
market share is 0.213, indicating that the US options market is moderately concentrated during the sample
period.
4.2. Other data sources
I obtain stock transaction data from the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. I follow Lee and
Ready (1991) in signing trade directions. After applying the quote rule, if the trade is still unclassified, I
compare the trade price with the last different trade price. If the current trade price is above (below) the last
different price, it is classified as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated). Unlike Lee and Ready (1991), however, I
collapse trades made at the same second into one record weighted by dollar volume and use the most updated
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) prices one second before the trade time (t − 1) for trade signing. In
addition to excluding canceled trades and data errors, I also exclude trades made within the first 15 minutes
and the last five minutes of trading to increase the accuracy of trade signing and to match the observation
period of OOI.
Finally, stock returns are calculated using the midpoints of the closing bid-ask spreads collected from
the CRSP. The number of analysts following is extracted from I/B/E/S, and the institutional ownership data
from Form 13-F filings in the Thomson Reuters database.
To be included in the final sample, a stock-day observation must have valid stock price information from
the CRSP with share code 10 or 11; and the stock must have options listed on a US exchange. On average,
the final sample includes 2,207 stocks a day.
4.3. Statistics of the main variables
I construct SOI and OOI as discussed earlier. If there is no option (stock) transaction on a particular
day, OOI (SOI) is set to zero. I use the Black and Scholes (1973) model to calculate option delta and for
simplicity assume a 0% interest rate and a 0% dividend rate. Panel A of table 2 presents the time series
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averages of the cross-sectional statistics for the main variables. For ease of reporting, I scale stock returns
and all order imbalance variables to basis points (bp). The average total order imbalance (TOI) is close to
zero (-0.782 bp), with the median even smaller (-0.348 bp). The standard deviation of TOI reaches 21 bp,
approximately 27 times its mean. As a result, TOI is not significantly different from zero, indicating that the
stock market is well balanced overall. In extreme cases, the maximum imbalance goes beyond 2.7% of all
shares outstanding and the minimum is below -3.98%. SOI has statistics very similar to those of TOI with
a mean of -0.773 bp and a standard deviation of 21.71 bp. OOI is even smaller on average, with a mean
of -0.016 bp. Compared with the stock market, the options market is a more balanced market because the
skewness of OOI (0.272) is much smaller than SOI (-3.058). Although the tails of OOI are not as long as
SOI, OOI has larger excess kurtosis (327) than SOI (182), indicating that both SOI and OOI have fat tails.
The average size of the bid-ask spread is 0.28% of the midpoint price on the stock market. It is interesting
to compare the imbalance variables with the turnover ratio because the turnover ratio is also standardized
using number of shares outstanding. The average turnover ratio is approximately 1.38%. At its maximum,
over 46% of the shares outstanding change hands on one day. Stock and options volumes are reported as
log total volumes traded. Average stock volume is around 13.2, equivalent to approximately 540,365 shares
a day. Average options volume is equivalent to approximately 2,697 shares a day. It is obvious that the
options market is still not the same size as the stock market.
In panel B, I report the time series averages of the daily cross-sectional correlations. The stock returns
have large and positive contemporaneous correlations with all order imbalance variables, and the correlation
with TOI reaches 0.211, suggesting the order imbalances have strong impact on contemporaneous stock
prices. The correlation between TOI and SOI is 0.962, but the correlation between TOI and OOI is only
0.067, suggesting that the majority of TOI is determined by stock market investors. SOI has a larger contem-
poraneous correlation with returns (0.188) than does OOI (0.082). The correlation between SOI and OOI is
negative (-0.188). 50.63% of the observations have SOI and OOI with different signs. A natural explanation
of that finding is that although I exclude reported structured trades, investors may have used options to hedge
their newly established stock positions–for example, covered calls and protected puts. Such trades are less
likely to be based on private information and should weaken the return predictability by adding noise to
OOI. The imbalance variables have small correlations with the spread, turnover, and trading volumes. The
stock market and the options market tend to be active at the same time because the correlation between the
stock volume and the options volume is 0.674.
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Panel C presents the cross-sectional averages of the autocorrelations for each variable up to five lags.
The autocorrelations of TOI and SOI are strong and positive. For example, the autocorrelation of TOI is
0.105 at the first lag; and it gradually decays to 0.026 at the fifth lag. By comparison, autocorrelation is
much smaller for OOI. It is only 0.028 at the first lag and almost dies out at the fifth lag. The bid-ask spread,
the turnover ratio, and the stock and options volumes all have highly positive and persistent autocorrelations.
The relationship between OOI and SOI is further examined in table3, which shows the statistics of two
OOI-to-SOI ratios: one original and one using the absolute values. To address the ratio explosion when SOI
is close to zero, I winsorize both ratios at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels. The original OOI-to-SOI ratio has a
mean of -0.028. The standard deviation of the ratio is 0.986. The average absolute ratio is 0.341, but the
median is only 0.033. Even the 90th percentile absolute ratio is smaller than 1 (0.629). It is clear that OOI
is relatively small compared with SOI and that TOI is dominated by SOI.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Predicting stock returns using SOI and OOI
Table 4 contains the main results using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. Reported are average
slope coefficients estimated from the cross-sectional regressions and the Newey and West (1987) adjusted
t-statistics. The coefficient estimates show little autocorrelation. For many series, the autocorrelation esti-
mates are insignificant even at the first lag. The maximum length of significant lag for all series is three. To
be conservative in the reported t-statistics, I choose to use the maximum length of three lags for all Newey-
West standard error calculation. I first test the predictive ability of TOI in the first column by estimating the
following equation:
Reti,t = α+βTOIi,t−1+ εi,t . (5)
TOI has an average slope coefficient of -0.002, and the t-statistics is -0.05, suggesting TOI has no significant
predictive power. Column (2) presents regression results from using decomposed order imbalances. The
OOI coefficient 0.59 is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 5.59). The SOI coefficient is
positive but insignificant (t-statistic = 0.54). Only OOI positively and significantly predicts the next day’s
returns. I then add lagged order imbalance variables to the model to investigate whether the predictive
relations would reverse at longer horizons. Column (3) shows that SOI on day t − 2 has a significant and
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negative coefficient of -0.106 (t-statistic = -2.66) but the lagged OOIs have only insignificant coefficients.
The full model in equation (3) is examined in column (4). With microstructure controls, OOI still positively
predicts the next day’s returns. The reversal effect of SOI becomes less significant as the t−2 SOI coefficient
drops to -0.063 (t-statistic = -1.82). I also find that both stock and option trading volumes significantly
predict returns, but in opposite directions. Large stock volume is associated with positive future returns, but
large option volume is associated with negative returns. That finding is consistent with a recent paper by
Johnson and So (2012), which shows that option-to-stock volume ratio negatively predicts stock returns.
There can be concerns that during the sample period, the market experiences a major financial crisis in
2008, when unusual market volatility and frequent regulation intervention could have distorted the generality
of the results. For a robustness check, I reestimate the full model using data from 2009 and 2010 only. The
results are reported in column (5). Comparing columns (4) and (5), I find the results to be quite similar,
except that in the after-crisis period, the first lag SOI becomes marginally significant. For robustness check,
I also measure SOI and OOI at one hour before market close and repeat the full regression in column (6).
The results are largely the same.
The results in this table have important implications for the first two hypotheses. On one hand, I find
SOI has weak predictive power of future returns. The reversal effect on day t +2 indicates transitory price
pressure from SOI rather than information. On the other hand, OOI positively predicts future returns and
the predictability does not reverse at longer horizons, thereby providing unambiguous evidence that options
order flow contains a significant amount of private information about the underlying stock’s price movement.
I then perform a simple investment analysis to gauge the economic significance of the return predictabil-
ity. On each day, quintile portfolios are formed based on each order imbalance variable. The top quintile
portfolio with the most negative order imbalance is defined as the “sell” portfolio, and the bottom quintile
portfolio with the most positive order imbalance is defined as the “buy” portfolio. A zero-investment port-
folio is constructed by buying all of the stocks in the buy portfolio and selling all of the stocks in the sell
portfolio with equal weight at market close. All of the portfolios are re-balanced the next day. Because I
measure all order imbalance variables at 15:55 every day, there is a five-minute window for those trading
strategies to be executed.
Table 5 gives the portfolio returns. TOI strategy generates a V-shape pattern in quintile portfolio returns,
and the long-short portfolio does not generate a significant return (t-statistic = 0.65). The average returns on
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the quintile portfolios based on SOI have the same V-shape pattern, and there is no significant return on the
long-short portfolio either. The returns on OOI portfolios increase almost monotonically across the quintile
portfolios. The “sell” portfolio has an average return of 2.095 bp per day, and the “buy” portfolio has an
average return of 10.831 bp. The daily abnormal return reaches 8.736 bp (t-statistic = 6.03), annualized to
22%. The abnormal return is significant at the 1% level, after controlling for Fama-French risk factors and
the momentum factor. The annual Sharpe ratio of the OOI strategy reaches 3.754.
5.2. An intraday analysis
In this subsection, I investigate high-frequency return predictability from SOI and OOI at half-hour
intervals. The empirical test is based on the following equation:
Rett,t+1 = α+
2
∑
k=1
βk1SOIt−k,t−k+1+
2
∑
k=1
βk2OOIt−k,t−k+1+θXt + εt+1, (6)
where Rett,t+1 is the stock return calculated using the midpoints of NBBO prices from time t to t +1, with
the time unit being half an hour; and Xt includes the NBBO returns for the last two periods, the percentage
bid-ask spread at time t, log total stock volume, and log total option volume in the last half hour. Firm
subscription is omitted. When constructing order imbalances, I exclude the first half hour and the last hour
of each trading day. I choose two lags of the imbalance variables in the regressions as a result of balancing
the goals of detecting potential reversal effects and preserving the sample size from missing values. Each
stock then has nine half-hour observations that can be used for estimating equation (6) on each day.
Column (1) of table 6 gives Fama-MacBeth regression results in the full sample. SOI positively predicts
the next half-hour returns with an estimated coefficient of 0.082 (t-statistic = 2.12). However, the predictive
relation reverses to significantly negative (t-statistic = -3.86) in the following half hour. The SOIt−2,t−1
coefficient is -0.075–almost offsetting the SOIt−1,t impact completely. The OOIt−1,t coefficient is 0.353
(t-statistic = 3.48), and the second lag OOI has an insignificant coefficient (t-statistic = -0.18). The rest of
the columns show regression results for each half-hour interval separately. For example, column (2) gives
the time series averages of the coefficients estimated from cross-sectional regressions using only the first
observation of the day. Out of the nine half-hour trading periods, both SOIt−1,t and SOIt−2,t−1 have 5%
significant coefficients in three periods; and OOIt−1,t has 5% significant coefficients in six periods. The high
frequency results confirm the permanent price impact of OOI and the transitory price pressure of SOI.
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5.3. Option leverage
Having established the link between options order flow and future stock prices, I then test hypothesis
3, that informed traders prefer to use options with higher leverage. Table7 contains the regression results
of equation (4). I first show univariate regression results. Column (1) demonstrates that OOI constructed
using only OTM options does not predict returns. This OOI measure is not informative although OTM
options provide option investors the largest leverage. Columns (2) and (3) show that OOI constructed using
either ATM options or ITM options significantly predicts future return. The multivariate regression result
in column (4) confirms the finding. The result is also robust after adding SOI in column (5) and the full
microstructure controls in column (6). Therefore, I find no empirical support for hypothesis 3. A possible
explanation is that the transaction costs associated with OTM options could be too high. I find that during
the sample period, the average percentage bid-ask spread of OTM options reaches 11.4%. For ATM and
ITM options, the percentage bid-ask spreads are only 3.46% and 3%, respectively. This finding is consistent
with the theoretical prediction of Johnson and So (2012). If informed traders buy OTM options to gain
high leverage, it is likely that they would need to reverse trade positions rather than exercise the options
to take profit. In so doing, they pay the full amount of the bid-ask spread, thereby sharply increasing their
transaction costs. The results in table 7 suggest that consideration of transaction costs can outweigh the
desire for leverage when informed traders allocate their orders across options with different moneyness.
5.4. Level of information asymmetry
This subsection tests hypothesis 4 that OOI has greater return predictability for firms with more infor-
mation asymmetry. Based on each of the five proxies for information asymmetry, I divide the full sample
into three subgroups: low, medium, and high. I then run full specification regressions of equation (3) in
each subgroup. Because the main interest of the test is the predictive ability of OOI in subgroups, I report
in table 8 only the estimated coefficients and t-statistics of OOIt−1. Panel A shows that the OOI coeffi-
cient is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.17) in the high PIN group, marginally significant in the
medium PIN group (t-statistic = 1.77), but not significant in the low PIN group. Panel B shows that the OOI
coefficient is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 2.99) in the low analyst coverage group, marginally
significant in the medium coverage group, but not in the high coverage group. Panel C shows that OOI
has significant coefficients in all subgroups based on the bid-ask spread. However, the coefficient is 1.004
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(t-statistic = 2.75) in the high spread group, which is much greater than the coefficient of 0.433 (t-statistic
= 1.68) in the low spread group. Similar patterns of the OOI coefficients are found in panels D and E based
on the adverse-selection component of the spread, and in panel F based on the firm size. Collectively, those
results suggest that consistent with hypothesis 4, OOI is more informative for firms with higher levels of
information asymmetry.
5.5. Short-sale costs
This subsection describes the testing of hypothesis 5 that information content of OOI increases in short-
sale costs of a stock measured by institutional ownership. Panel G in table 8 gives the results. OOI is
statistically significant at the 10% level in all ownership subgroups. However, the OOI coefficient is 1.096
(t-statistic = 3.86) in the low ownership group and 0.252 (t-statistic = 1.84) in the high ownership group. The
differences of the magnitude of the coefficients and t-statistics demonstrate that OOI has a larger amount of
information for firms with low institutional ownership and high short-sale costs, supporting hypothesis 5.
5.6. Information versus illiquidity
Hypothesis 6 is tested in this subsection. Panel G in table 8 shows that OOI does not significantly
predict returns when option trading is inactive and the options trading volume is low. The OOI coefficients
are statistically significant at the 1% level in both the medium volume group (t-statistic = 2.67) and the
high volume group (t-statistic = 4.38), suggesting that the predictive ability of OOI comes from periods
when the options market is active. The results are consistent with the information explanation for the return
predictability of OOI.
6. Further analysis
The previous section shows that options order flow contains important price information about the un-
derlying stocks. In this section, I perform additional analysis to better understand that information linkage.
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6.1. Asymmetric price response
I first investigate whether there exist asymmetric price responses to the imbalance variables by estimating
the following equation:
Reti,t =α+β1SOIi,t−1+β2OOIi,t−1+β3D1i,t−1+β4SOIi,t−1 ·D1i,t−1
+β5D2i,t−1+β6OOIi,t−1 ·D2i,t−1+θXi,t−1+ εi,t , (7)
where D1 and D2 are binary sign dummies for SOI and OOI, respectively. The dummy equals 1 when the
corresponding imbalance is positive, and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in the first column of table9.
The SOI coefficient is -0.221, statistically significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = -3.2). β3 estimate is in-
significant. The interaction of SOI and D1 has a significant coefficient of 0.509 (t-statistic = 4.55). The
combined coefficient of SOI becomes positive when SOI is positive. The OOI coefficient is 0.691, statis-
tically significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 3.97). Estimated β5 is 3.458 (t-statistic = 4.22), suggesting
there is a jump in the intercept when OOI turns positive. The negative coefficient estimate of the interac-
tion of OOI and D2 (-0.638, t-statistic = -2.37) largely offsets the OOI coefficient, suggesting the predictive
power of OOI mainly comes from negative OOIs. The results in this table (i) demonstrate clear asymmetric
price responses to both SOI and OOI and (ii) are consistent with the fact that informed traders with bad news
might trade only options because of short-sale constraints in the stock market.
6.2. Nonlinear price impact
This subsection investigates nonlinearity in the predictive relationship. Both SOI and OOI have fat tails.
It is possible that the stock price response will be different in the tails of order imbalances. I then estimate
the following specification:
Reti,t = α+β1SOIi,t−1+β2OOIi,t−1+β3SOI2i,t−1 ·S1i,t−1+β4OOI2i,t−1 ·S2i,t−1+θXi,t−1+ εi,t , (8)
where S1 and S2 are dummy variables that equal 1 when SOI and OOI are positive, respectively, and -
1 otherwise. The interaction terms quadratically amplify the impact of the two imbalance variables and
will parse out the tail effect. The second column of table 9 gives regression results. Both SOI and OOI
coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. No significant nonlinear effect is found
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on SOI because β3 is insignificant. However, β4 is negative and significant at the 1% level (t-statistic =
-3.66), indicating that the predictive ability of OOI reduces in the tails.
6.3. Moving average and shocks
Both SOI and OOI have positive autocorrelations. In this subsection, I decompose each imbalance
variable into a moving average (MA) component and a shock component to further investigate the sources
of the price impact. For example,
OOI = OOIMAk +OOIshockk , (9)
where OOIMAk is the average OOI from the previous k trading days. For simplicity, I omit the firm and
time subscription in equation (9). The same decomposition is also performed for SOI. Then, I estimate the
following equation:
Reti,t = α+β1SOIMAi,t−1 +β2SOIshocki,t−1 +β3OOIMAi,t−1 +β4OOIshocki,t−1 +θXi,t−1+ εi,t , (10)
Three MA periods of 3 days, 5 days, and 10 days are chosen, and the results are reported in table10. Panel A
shows that the time series averages of the daily cross-sectional correlations between the MAs and the shocks
are large and negative for both SOI and OOI. For example, the 3-day correlations are -0.468 and -0.514 for
SOI and OOI, respectively. As the length of the MA increases, the correlations become weaker.
Panel B reports the regression results of equation (10). The first column reports the result using a 3-day
MA decomposition. Although the MA’s and the shocks are negatively correlated, both of them are positively
correlated with future stock returns. Neither the MA or the shock of SOI significantly predicts stock returns.
For OOI, both the MA and the shock have significant coefficient estimates. But the shock component has a
larger t-statistic (3.94) than the MA (2.16). As the MA horizon increases, the predictive ability of the OOI
MA becomes slightly weaker, but the predictive ability of the OOI shock component stays unchanged.
6.4. Earnings announcement
This subsection investigates the relationship between order imbalances and earnings announcements.
Several studies such as Skinner (1990) and Ho (1993) find that stocks with options exhibit smaller price
reactions to earnings surprise, suggesting that option trading disseminates new information regarding earn-
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ings. Amin and Lee (1997) show that an increase in option open interest before an announcement is related
to the direction of the earnings surprise. More recently, Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2010) and
Johnson and So (2012) find that the option-to-stock volume ratio predicts the earnings surprise and the cu-
mulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement. If option trading contains private information,
the return predictability from OOI should also be prominent around earnings announcements.
I collect earnings announcements data from I/B/E/S and merge that with the options sample. The final
sample contains 21,103 observations on 2,647 firms. I follow Carhart (1997) and calculate risk-adjusted
returns for each firm. Then I construct CAR around four alternative event windows: (0,2), (0,4), (-1,1), and
(-2,2). For example, CAR(0,2) represents the three-day cumulative risk-adjusted returns from the announce-
ment day t to day t +2. Mirroring previous tests, I estimate the following equation:
CAR( j,k) = α+
5+ j
∑
t=1
βk1SOIj−t +
5+ j
∑
t=1
βk2OOIj−t +θXj−1+ ε j,k, (11)
where the independent variables are the same as defined before. Table11 presents cross-sectional regres-
sion results with standard errors clustered by firms. Across different event windows, OOI−5 always has
significant coefficient estimates. For example, in a prediction of CAR(0,2), the OOI−5 coefficient is 4.279
(t-statistic = 2.64). The predictive ability of OOI−5 is largely the same in the other event windows. The SOI
coefficients are mostly insignificant, except SOI−2 when predicting CAR(−1,1). The results indicate that the
options market reveals information about scheduled earnings disclosure five days before the announcement.
Informed trading should be more active when potential profit is high. I use two proxies for potential
profit: (i) earnings surprise, defined as the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings per
share (EPS) and analyst consensus of EPS forecast immediately prior to the announcement, and (ii) analyst
dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of analyst EPS forecast. Similarly to table8, table 12 presents
the coefficients and t-statistics of OOI−5 from subgroup regression results. The dependent variable in these
regressions is CAR(0,2) because alternative event windows generate even stronger results. Panel A shows that
the OOI−5 coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level (8.486, t-statistic = 3.74) in the high surprise
group, but not significant in the other two groups, suggesting that the predictive ability of OOI−5 comes
mainly from those events with large earnings surprises. Panel B demonstrates that OOI−5 significantly
predicts CAR for both positive and negative forecasting errors. However, the negative error group has a
larger coefficient estimate and a larger t-statistic than the positive error group, possibly due to the short-
sale constraints in the stock market. Panel C demonstrates that OOI−5 is not informative when analyst
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dispersion is low. However, when analysts exhibit divergent opinions, OOI−5 significantly predicts CAR.
Panel D shows that the return predictability is stronger for firms with low analyst coverage, supporting the
informational role of option trading. Using alternative measures of information asymmetry generates large
the same results.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate whether option trading activity provides additional price information that is
not in the stock market. By decomposing total stock order imbalance into an option-induced imbalance
component and a residual component that is unrelated to option trading, I show that option-induced stock
order imbalance positively and significantly predicts future stock returns and the predictive relation does not
reverse at longer horizons. The remaining order imbalance generates only temporary price pressure on the
stock price and exhibits a reversal effect later. The results hold at both daily and half-hour frequencies. The
evidence suggests that a substantial amount of private information exists in options order flow. Specifically,
permanent price information comes mainly from option contracts with relatively narrow bid-ask spreads
(i.e., ATM and ITM options) but not contracts with higher leverage (i.e., OTM options).
I also investigate the link between information content in options order flow and the level of information
asymmetry, short-sale costs, and market liquidity. Consistent with theoretical predictions, I find that return
predictability from OOI is stronger for firms with high PIN, low analyst coverage, large bid-ask spread, large
adverse-selection component of the spread, small market capitalization, and low institutional ownership.
The concentration of informed traders and the short-sale constraints enhance the informational role of option
trading in price discovery. The options market also becomes more informative when option trading is active,
which is consistent with the prediction by Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) that informed trading is more
likely to occur in deep and liquid markets. In an event study, I also find that OOI significantly predicts CARs
five days before earnings announcements.
My findings indicate that the options market plays a key role in embedding private information into
stock prices. The imbalance in options order flow and stock order flow can contain different messages for
the market. In fact, those two order imbalance variables are negatively correlated on average. The results
suggest that there can exist market frictions that prevent all investors from immediately learning the stock
price information in the options order flow. For example, the cost of monitoring and collecting order flow
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information can be too high for most investors. It is also possible that the options order flow is too complex
for retail investors to understand.8 As a result, the spot price does not fully adjust to the new information
immediately, and the return predictability is preserved.
The proposed OOI focuses on delta risk and has shown significant predictability regarding underlying
stock price. Option contracts have other risk exposures that can be analyzed in similar ways. For future
research, it would be interesting to investigate in a multidimensional framework the information links be-
tween the derivative markets and the underlying market because some risk can be traded only in the options
market. Understanding that issue is important to both academicians and practitioners.
8In a related study, Henderson and Pearson (2011) show that retail investors persistently overprice a popular structured equity
product.
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Table 1
Summary statistics of the options market
This table describes options market activity from April 2008 to August 2010. Only single-name equity
options with maturities of more than 10 days are included in the sample. The following trade records are
excluded: (i) off-hour trades, (ii) trades at market open (the first 15 minutes) and market close (the last
five minutes), (iii) trades that are reported to the OPRA as “late” or “cancel”, (iv) trades flagged as part
of structured trades, and (v) data errors such as 0 strike price or 0 trade price. All statistics are reported
for the full sample as well as in the four transaction-type groups based on trade direction and option type:
buy call, sell call, buy put, and sell put. The trade direction is based on the quote rule. Panel A provides
descriptive statistics of number of firms per day. Panel B reports trade level statistics. Trading volume is in
option lots (equivalent to 100 shares of the underlying stocks). Panel C shows trading volume breakdown
(as percentages of the total volume) based on option moneyness, delta, and maturity, T . delta is calculated
using the Black-Scholes formula assuming 0% interest rate and 0% dividend rate. Panel D gives the volume
breakdown by option exchanges.
Statistics All Buy Call Sell Call Buy Put Sell Put
Panel A: Number of firms per day
Mean 1,670 1,390 1,400 1,179 1,164
Max 1,909 1,709 1,738 1,634 1,503
Min 1,395 1,091 1,086 839 874
Std 98 120 115 120 102
Panel B: Transaction statistics
Mean trade size 17.45 17.74 16.16 18.80 17.67
Mean daily number of trades 273,102 74,114 75,321 49,145 47,147
Mean daily trade volume 4,765,903 1,314,526 1,217,082 924,072 832,880
Mean daily premium (in millions) 1,031.36 254.07 246.89 223.15 206.45
Panel C: Percentages of trading volume by moneyness and maturity
OTM : |delta|< 37.5% 51.94 13.21 11.77 11.62 10.21
ATM : 37.5% ≤ |delta| ≤ 62.5% 33.91 10.11 9.52 5.75 5.21
IT M : |delta|> 62.5% 14.14 4.26 4.25 2.03 2.06
10 < T ≤ 30 days 36.64 10.25 9.22 7.12 6.46
31 < T ≤ 60 days 27.91 7.78 7.05 5.46 4.82
T > 60 days 35.45 9.55 9.27 6.81 6.20
Panel D: Percentages of trading volume by exchange
American Stock Exchange 7.15 1.93 1.82 1.32 1.28
BATS 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Boston Options Exchange 4.70 1.24 1.17 1.01 0.97
Chicago Board Options Exchange 29.66 8.76 8.05 5.79 5.06
International Securities Exchange 27.43 7.06 6.88 5.58 4.97
Nasdaq 2.50 0.64 0.65 0.45 0.44
New York Stock Exchange ARCA 11.59 2.69 2.62 2.08 1.90
Philadelphia Stock Exchange 16.92 4.79 4.40 3.22 2.91
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics of main variables
Panel A reports the time series averages of the cross-sectional statistics. Ret is the daily return calculated using the
midpoint of the bid and ask prices at the close of the stock market. TOI is the total stock order imbalance. SOI
is the order imbalance induced by stock market investors other than option market makers. OOI is the option order
imbalance measured as delta imbalance. spread is the percentage bid-ask spread of the mid quote in the stock market.
turnover is the total stock trading volume scaled by number of shares outstanding, reported as percentages. Vol stock
and Voloption are log total stock and option trading volumes from 9:45 to 15:55, respectively. Ret, TOI, SOI, and
OOI are reported as basis points. Panel B presents the time series averages of the contemporaneous cross-sectional
correlations. Panel C gives the cross-sectional averages of autocorrelations up to five lags for each variable.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variables N Mean Std Median Min Max Skew Kurt
Ret 1,348,555 4.602 407.019 -6.005 -3269.897 7193.655 2.698 111.010
TOI 1,348,555 -0.782 21.178 -0.348 -397.915 269.771 -3.276 181.018
SOI 1,340,407 -0.773 21.710 -0.343 -403.796 282.378 -3.058 182.394
OOI 1,340,407 -0.016 5.517 -0.001 -106.223 109.196 0.272 327.125
spread 1,348,555 0.279 0.636 0.131 -0.550 14.153 9.929 180.013
turnover 1,348,552 1.375 1.923 0.945 0.018 46.133 10.558 238.320
Voloption 1,348,555 7.900 4.593 9.003 0.000 17.667 -0.658 -0.663
Volstock 1,346,313 13.195 1.558 13.083 7.623 19.464 0.249 0.149
Panel B: Correlations
Ret TOI SOI OOI spread turnover Voloption Volstock
Ret 1
TOI 0.211 1
SOI 0.188 0.962 1
OOI 0.082 0.067 -0.188 1
spread -0.007 -0.040 -0.040 0.000 1
turnover 0.068 -0.072 -0.071 0.001 -0.034 1
Voloption 0.027 0.019 0.019 -0.000 -0.258 0.325 1
Volstock 0.025 0.008 0.006 0.005 -0.233 0.434 0.674 1
Panel C: Autocorrelations
lag Ret TOI SOI OOI spread turnover Voloption Volstock
1 -0.021 0.105 0.101 0.028 0.170 0.436 0.322 0.358
2 -0.031 0.053 0.051 0.009 0.157 0.309 0.265 0.295
3 0.016 0.035 0.034 0.006 0.152 0.253 0.233 0.256
4 -0.018 0.028 0.028 0.004 0.153 0.226 0.215 0.239
5 -0.028 0.026 0.026 0.003 0.152 0.207 0.202 0.219
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Table 3
Option order imbalance relative to stock order imbalance
This table compares the magnitude of option order imbalance (OOI) and stock order imbalance (SOI). Two
ratios–one original and one using absolute values–are calculated in the full sample, and detailed statistics
are presented. Both ratios are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5%.
OOI/SOI |OOI/SOI|
MIN -19.689 0
1st percentile -3.354 0
10th percentile -0.309 0
25th percentile -0.040 0.002
MEDIAN -0.000 0.033
75th percentile 0.028 0.174
90th percentile 0.202 0.629
99th percentile 3.088 6.388
MAX 25.094 35.898
MEAN -0.028 0.341
STD 0.986 1.360
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Table 4
Daily regressions of stock returns on lagged stock and option order imbalances
The first column reports the Fama-MacBeth regression results of the following equation:
Reti,t = α+βTOIi,t−1+ εi,t .
Reti,t is stock i’s return calculated using the midpoint of the bid-ask spread at market close on day t. TOI i,t−1 is stock
i’s total order imbalance on day t − 1. The rest of the columns present the Fama-MacBeth regression results based on
the following equation:
Reti,t = α+
5
∑
k=1
βk1SOIi,t−k+
5
∑
k=1
βk2OOIi,t−k +θXi,t−1+ εi,t .
SOIi,t−k is stock i’s order imbalance induced by stock market investors other than option market makers on day t − k.
OOIi,t−k is the option order imbalance measured as delta imbalance. Xi,t−1 is a set of control variables on day t − 1
including Reti,t−k, stock returns for the previous five days; spread, the percentage stock bid-ask spread; turnover, the
ratio of total stock trading volume to the number of shares outstanding; Vol stock, log total stock volume from 9:45 to
15:55; and Voloption, log total option volume from 9:45 to 15:55. Column (5) gives results in the subsample period from
2009 to 2010. Column (6) reports regression results using order imbalances measured at 15:00 every day. Standard
errors are calculated with Newey-West adjustment to three lags. T -statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 4.957 3.978 3.899 -34.479*** -26.048 -29.394**
(0.51) (0.41) (0.40) (-2.85) (-2.07) (-2.49)
TOIt−1 -0.002
(-0.05)
SOIt−1 0.023 0.037 0.023 0.076* 0.126***
(0.54) (0.85) (0.59) (1.72) (2.85)
SOIt−2 -0.106*** -0.063* -0.048* -0.063*
(-2.66) (-1.82) (-1.66) (-1.77)
SOIt−3 0.046 0.032 0.022 0.044
(1.02) (1.05) (0.73) (1.14)
SOIt−4 0.057 0.050 0.041 -0.003
(0.60) (0.74) (0.43) (-0.08)
SOIt−5 -0.059 -0.011 -0.062 0.046
(-0.65) (-0.18) (-0.73) (1.27)
OOIt−1 0.590*** 0.531*** 0.414*** 0.351*** 0.650***
(5.59) (5.12) (4.23) (3.04) (3.59)
OOIt−2 0.036 0.086 0.099 0.167
(0.27) (0.69) (0.80) (0.68)
OOIt−3 -0.070 -0.065 -0.081 -0.030
(-0.71) (-0.68) (-0.75) (-0.21)
OOIt−4 -0.058 -0.019 -0.101 -0.167
(-0.49) (-0.18) (-0.93) (-1.00)
OOIt−5 -0.018 -0.012 -0.063 -0.156
(-0.16) (-0.11) (-0.50) (-0.97)
Rett−1 0.003 0.006 0.002
(0.70) (1.23) (0.54)
Rett−2 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005
(-1.25) (-1.54) (-1.23)
Rett−3 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(-1.44) (-1.26) (-1.55)
Rett−4 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.27) (-0.34) (-0.31)
Rett−5 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(-0.62) (0.01) (-0.52)
spread 4.035 8.245** 4.315
(1.26) (1.96) (1.35)
turnover 0.009 0.001 0.012
(0.97) (0.13) (1.34)
Volstock 2.735*** 2.790*** 2.319***
(3.46) (3.16) (2.98)
Voloption -0.776*** -0.709** -0.692*** *
(-3.48) (-2.57) (-3.13)
N of obs 1348290 1342322 1297690 1295057 892657 1297024
Adj R-sq 0.008 0.009 0.021 0.064 0.061 0.064
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Table 5
Alphas of order imbalance strategies
This table reports average daily returns on equally-weighted quintile portfolios based on total order imbal-
ance (TOI), stock order imbalance (SOI), and option order imbalance (OOI) as well as abnormal returns
(alpha) from long-short portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced every day at market close based on or-
der imbalance signals from 9:45 to 15:55. Strategy alphas are reported in three forms: the original, the
Fama-French three-factor, and four-factor adjusted alphas. All returns are reported as basis points. Sharpe
is the annualized Sharpe ratio. T -statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
TOI SOI OOI
low - 1 17.857 8.929 2.095
2 8.852 2.739 4.405
3 3.626 1.804 7.018
4 4.488 3.411 4.908
high - 5 19.372 10.396 10.831
5-1 1.515 1.467 8.736***
t-stat (0.65) (0.81) (6.03)
FF3 alpha 1.581 1.486 8.787***
t-stat (0.70) (0.85) (6.28)
FF4 alpha 1.372 1.228 8.600***
t-stat (0.61) (0.71) (6.16)
Sharpe 0.345 0.426 3.754
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Table 7
Return predictability from option order imbalance by moneyness groups
This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results of the following equation:
Reti,t = α+β1SOIi,t−1+β2OT M OOIi,t−1+β3ATM OOIi,t−1+β4IT M OOIi,t−1 +θXi,t−1+ εi,t .
Reti,t is stock i’s return calculated using the midpoint of the bid-ask spread at market close on day t. SOI i,t−1 is the
stock order imbalance induced by stock market investors other than option market makers on day t−1. OT M OOI i,t−1
is the option order imbalance measured as delta imbalance calculated using out-of-the-money (OTM) contracts.
ATM OOIi,t−k is the option order imbalance calculated using at-the-money (ATM) contracts. ITM OOI i,t−k is the
option order imbalance calculated using in-the-money (ITM) contracts. X i,t−1 is a set of control variables on day t −1,
including Reti,t−k, stock returns for the previous five days; spread, the percentage stock bid-ask spread; turnover, the
ratio of total stock trading volume to number of shares outstanding; Vol stock and Voloption, log total stock volume and
total option volume from 9:45 to 15:55. Standard errors are calculated with Newey-West adjustment to three lags.
T -statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intercept 5.204 5.224 5.253 5.204 4.082 -37.655***
(0.53) (0.53) (0.54) (0.53) (0.42) (-3.10)
OTM OOIt−1 0.651 0.435 0.996* 0.609
(0.98) (0.64) (1.75) (1.04)
ATM OOIt−1 0.778*** 0.740*** 0.738*** 0.682***
(3.03) (2.81) (2.99) (2.98)
IT M OOIt−1 1.068*** 0.977*** 0.940*** 0.741**
(2.85) (2.64) (2.61) (2.18)
SOIt−1 0.116** 0.133***
(2.42) (3.07)
Rett−1 -0.002
(-0.47)
Rett−2 0.002
(0.49)
Rett−3 -0.004
(-1.24)
Rett−4 -0.004
(-1.23)
Rett−5 -0.002
(-0.59)
spread 4.083
(1.27)
turnover 0.011
(1.25)
Volstock 2.974***
(3.57)
VolOTM -0.303**
(-1.97)
VolATM -0.145
(-0.99)
VolIT M -0.663***
(-4.63)
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Table 8
Predictive power of order imbalances and firm characteristics
This table presents the subgroup results based on firm characteristics. For each firm characteristic variable,
the full sample is divided into three groups: low (< 30th percentile), medium (30th ∼ 70th percentile),
and high (> 70th percentile). Within each group, I estimate the following equation using Fama-MacBeth
regressions:
Rett,t+1 = α+
2
∑
k=1
βk1SOIt−k,t−k+1+
2
∑
k=1
βk2OOIt−k,t−k+1+θXt + εt+1.
Average slope coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported for option order imbalance on
day t − 1 (OOIt−1) only. PIN is the probability of informed trading from Easley and O’Hara (1992).
Analyst coverage is the number of analysts following. Spread is the percentage stock bid-ask spread.
GH adverse spread is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread based on the model of Glosten
and Harris (1988). LSB adverse spread is the adverse-selection component of the bid-ask spread based on
the model of Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995). Size is the market capitalization. Ownership is the percentage
of shares held by institutional investors. Option volume is the total option volume traded. Standard errors
are calculated with Newey-West adjustment to three lags. T -statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: PIN Panel B: Analyst coverage
low medium high low medium high
OOIt−1 0.252 0.321* 0.512*** OOIt−1 1.185*** 0.503* 0.399
(0.98) (1.77) (3.17) (2.99) (1.88) (1.42)
Panel C: Spread Panel D: GH adverse spread
low medium high low medium high
OOIt−1 0.433* 0.594** 1.004*** OOIt−1 0.270 0.371* 0.551**
(1.68) (2.01) (2.75) (0.95) (1.92) (2.74)
Panel E: LSB adverse spread Panel F: Size
low medium high small medium large
OOIt−1 0.299 0.512* 0.552*** OOIt−1 1.209*** 0.300** 0.276**
(1.49) (2.08) (3.53) (2.71) (1.98) (2.42)
Panel G: Ownership Panel H: Option volume
low medium high low medium high
OOIt−1 1.096*** 0.680*** 0.252* OOIt−1 61.295 1.675*** 0.500***
(3.86) (2.74) (1.84) (1.33) (2.67) (4.38)
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Table 9
Nonlinear price impact from option and stock order imbalances
The first column presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results from the equation:
Reti,t =α+β1SOIi,t−1+β2OOIi,t−1+β3D1i,t−1+β4SOIi,t−1 ·D1i,t−1+β5D2i,t−1+β6OOIi,t−1 ·D2i,t−1+θXi,t−1+ εi,t .
Reti,t is stock i’s return calculated using the midpoint of the bid-ask spreads at market close on day t. SOI i,t−1 is the
stock order imbalance. OOIi,t−1 is the option order imbalance measured as delta imbalance. D 1 and D2 equal 1 when
SOIi,t−1 and OOIi,t−1 are positive, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Xi, t − 1 includes spread, the percentage bid-ask
spread; turnover, the ratio of total stock volume to number of shares outstanding; Vol stock and Voloption, log total stock
and option volumes. The second column presents the regression results from the following equation:
Reti,t = α+β1SOIi,t−1+β2OOIi,t−1+β3SOI2i,t−1 ·S1i,t−1+β4OOI2i,t−1 ·S2i,t−1+θXi,t−1+ εi,t ,
where S1i,t−1 and S2i,t−1 are dummy variables that equal 1 when SOIi,t−1 and OOIi,t−1 are positive, respectively, and
-1 otherwise. Standard errors are calculated with Newey-West adjustment to three lags. T -statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
intercept -35.222** -29.205**
(-2.91) (-2.47)
SOI -0.221*** 0.123**
(-3.20) (2.56)
OOI 0.691*** 1.141***
(3.97) (5.93)
D1 -0.621
(-0.60)
D2 3.458***
(4.22)
D1*SOI 0.509***
(4.55)
D2*OOI -0.638**
(-2.37)
S1 ·SOI2 -0.001
(-1.23)
S2 ·OOI2 -0.021***
(-3.66)
Rett−1 0.002 0.003
(0.60) (0.60)
Rett−2 -0.004 -0.004
(-1.19) (-1.34)
Rett−3 -0.004 -0.004
(-1.16) (-1.25)
Rett−4 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.59) (-0.64)
Rett−5 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.49) (-0.43)
spread 3.503 3.927
(1.11) (1.23)
turnover -0.006 0.009
(-0.66) (0.96)
Volstock 2.717*** 2.637***
(3.50) (3.39)
Voloption -0.816*** -0.774***
(-3.59) (-3.44)
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Table 10
Moving averages and shocks in order imbalances and return predictability
Panel A presents the time series averages of the cross-sectional correlations between the 3-day, 5-day, and
10-day moving averages and the shock components for stock order imbalance (SOI) and option order im-
balance (OOI). Panel B reports the Fama-MacBeth regression results of the equation:
Reti,t = α+β1SOIMAi,t−1 +β2SOIshocki,t−1 +β3OOIMAi,t−1 +β4OOIshocki,t−1 +θXi,t−1+ εi,t ,
Reti,t is stock i’s return calculated using the midpoint of the bid-ask spreads at market close on day t. spread
is the percentage bid-ask spread of the midpoint. turnover is the ratio of total stock volume to the number of
shares outstanding. Volstock and Voloption are log total stock and option volumes from 9:45 to 15:55. Standard
errors are calculated with Newey-West adjustment to three lags. T -statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Correlations
3day 5day 10day
SOIMA and SOIshock -0.468 -0.381 -0.278
OOIMA and OOIshock -0.514 -0.435 -0.343
Panel B: Regression Results
3day 5day 10day
intercept -67.193*** -67.35*** -67.852***
(-4.35) (-4.35) (-4.35)
SOIMA 0.010 -0.024 -0.103
(0.16) (-0.36) (-1.09)
SOIshock -0.009 -0.007 -0.008
(-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.17)
OOIMA 0.436** 0.544** 0.496*
(2.16) (2.27) (1.83)
OOIshock 0.372*** 0.370*** 0.355***
(3.94) (3.97) (3.77)
Rett−1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.35)
Rett−2 -0.007* -0.007* -0.008*
(-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.80)
Rett−3 -0.007* -0.006* -0.006*
(-1.78) (-1.68) (-1.81)
Rett−4 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.09) (0.11) (-0.05)
Rett−5 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.63) (-0.65) (-0.60)
spread 17.985*** 17.879*** 18.259***
(2.62) (2.60) (2.63)
turnover 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.80) (0.83) (0.72)
Volstock 5.603*** 5.611*** 5.714***
(5.12) (5.12) (5.17)
Voloption -1.440*** -1.440*** -1.453***
(-4.73) (-4.73) (-4.77)
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Table 11
Predicting earnings cumulative abnormal returns using order imbalances
This table presents the cross-sectional regression results of the following equation:
CAR( j,k) = α+
5+ j
∑
t=1
βk1SOIj−t +
5+ j
∑
t=1
βk2OOIj−t +θXj−1+ ε j,k.
CAR j,k is the cumulative abnormal return from event day j to event day k relative to the earnings announcement day.
The rest of the variables are the same as defined earlier. Firm subscription is omitted for all variables. Standard errors
are clustered by firms. T -statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
CAR(0,2) CAR(0,4) CAR(−1,1) CAR(−2,2)
intercept 90.945 78.12 149.025* 30.905
(0.97) (0.87) (1.73) (0.29)
OOI−1 -1.661 -1.035
(-1.14) (-0.66)
OOI−2 2.173 2.410 0.901
(1.43) (1.46) (0.69)
OOI−3 1.076 0.433 0.883 0.344
(0.75) (0.26) (0.63) (0.16)
OOI−4 -0.662 -1.493 -0.460 -1.525
(-0.54) (-1.21) (-0.36) (-1.01)
OOI−5 4.279*** 4.845** 4.215*** 4.256**
(2.64) (2.54) (2.70) (2.09)
SOI−1 -0.11 0.231
(-0.21) (0.45)
SOI−2 0.848* 0.697 1.248**
(1.76) (1.24) (2.51)
SOI−3 -0.523 -0.502 -0.432 -0.550
(-1.22) (-1.28) (-1.13) (-0.94)
SOI−4 0.534 0.203 0.534 0.143
(0.99) (0.36) (0.93) (0.20)
SOI−5 -0.598 -0.338 0.033 -0.572
(-0.94) (-0.52) (0.06) (-0.62)
Ret−1 0.009 0.099
(0.00) (0.03)
Ret−2 -0.018 -0.021 -1.476
(-0.54) (-0.70) (-0.53)
Ret−3 -0.055** -0.076** -0.078*** -5.693*
(-2.05) (-2.54) (-2.74) (-1.70)
Ret−4 -0.009 -0.029 -0.010 0.009
(-0.31) (-0.94) (-0.37) (0.25)
Ret−5 0.004 0.022 -0.015 -0.033
(0.15) (0.82) (-0.62) (-1.13)
spread -33.53 -33.718 40.205 -4.324
(-1.14) (-1.30) (1.27) (-0.32)
turnover -0.050 -0.046 0.014 0.020
(-1.07) (-0.83) (0.26) (0.13)
Volstock -3.587 -0.803 -10.107 3.651
(-0.45) (-0.10) (-1.36) (0.36)
Voloption -1.817 -4.801 -0.206 -6.440*
(-0.66) (-1.60) (-0.08) (-1.77)
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Table 12
Order flow information and potential profit from informed earnings trading
For each variable measuring potential profit from informed trading around earnings announcements, the full
sample is divided into three groups: low (< 30th percentile), medium (30th ∼ 70th percentile), and high
(> 70th percentile). Slope coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported only for option order
imbalance five days before the announcement (OOI−5) whereas the regressions are based on the following
equation:
CAR(0,2) = α+
5
∑
t=1
βk1SOI−t +
5
∑
t=1
βk2OOI−t +θX−1+ ε0,2.
Surprise equals the difference between the actual quarterly earnings per share (EPS) minus the last analyst
forecast consensus before the announcement. Forecasting error is the signed earnings surprise defined as
actual EPS minus the analyst EPS forecast consensus. Dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst fore-
casts before the announcement. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts following. Standard errors are
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Surprise Panel B: Forecast error
low medium high negative neutral positive
OOI−5 0.212 2.912 8.276*** OOI−5 6.568*** 1.308* 4.103***
(0.63) (1.03) (3.74) (3.23) (0.35) (2.55)
Panel C: Dispersion Panel D: Analyst coverage
low medium high low medium high
OOI−5 0.806 8.762*** 3.889* OOI−5 5.395** 4.923* 1.347
(0.31) (3.22) (1.92) (2.55) (1.92) (0.47)
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